Vendor Collusion in Public Contracting Detection and Reporting



Two broad categories of business behavior that violate federal/state antitrust laws:



• Unilateral or monopolistic

Collusive

Unilateral or Monopolistic Behavior

- Single firm with market power
- Example: Microsoft found liable for using its market power in computer operating systems to keep others from even trying to compete for customers.

Collusive Behavior

- Agreements among competitors not to compete, or to otherwise restrict competition
- Examples: bid-rigging, price-fixing, market allocation



Collusive schemes, like most fraudulent and deceptive activities are, by their very nature, difficult to detect.



Vendors often have very convincing explanations for their behavior.



Bid-rigging conspiracies often involve feigned competition -- vendors dividing up the business into assigned territories or allocated customers, sometimes protecting each other with "sham" bids.







Case Study #1

The Attorney General's antitrust litigation involving commercial casualty insurance



The conspiracy...



Major US commercial casualty companies

Agreed: No competition for incumbent accounts





What if the purchaser questioned the premium increases or lack of other quotes?






Broker stepped in to gather sham or "B" quotes...

Roberta, Please fax back this "fake" quote. Thanks, Nicole

Please send me an email with an unattractive premium,



Informed public purchasers



Early detection






It is especially important to keep your eyes open for possible bidrigging when well-publicized grants or other funding sources become available for public projects.



So, what should you look for?





Three categories of red flags



- 1. Market conditions
- 2. Vendor behavior and physical clues
- 3. Patterns



Case Study #2

Antitrust litigation by the Ohio Attorney General's Office involving...

SCHOOL MILK



1993 - Confessions by Two Dairy

Executives:





- Rigged bids on milk sales to public schools in SW Ohio
- Agreed not to compete with incumbent
- Submitted sham bids





The Ohio Attorney General's Lawsuit:

- 451 public school districts in SW, SE and NE Ohio
- 13 dairies



The School Milk case illustrates the first Red Flag of Collusion...





Red Flag: Market Conditions

Some market conditions make it easier to form, maintain, enforce or conceal collusive arrangements.



Several features of the school milk market made it especially susceptible to anticompetitive activities. First:

Homogeneity or...

"Milk is milk!"





Product homogeneity means:

- Little difference between competing vendors' products
- Vendors compete mostly on price.

Thus, homogeneous products are more susceptible to bid-rigging, and other forms of collusion.



EXAMPLE:














Homogeneity makes it easier to control the outcome.



Is demand elastic or inelastic?



Can you switch?





makes sellers more confident that buyers will put up with increased prices resulting from collusion rather than switch to another product.

Inelastic demand




What were the schools' alternatives to milk?







Competitors Frequently Interacting







Being friendly and social is not inherently wrong but...

It provides

OPPORTUNITY!



Group of Available Bidders is Small and Stable



Nothing disrupts a conspiracy faster than a new seller entering the market!





The Second Red Flag of Collusion:

Vendor Behavior and Physical Clues



Even the craftiest vendor drops an occasional bread crumb that can lead to detection.





 Vendor submits its own bid and that of a competitor





Vendor makes reference –
 verbal or written – that
 he/she won't be bidding
 because...

"...this isn't my territory."



 Vendor(s) refrain from bidding for no apparent reason, even when invited to bid



• Vendor(s) continue to bid, even though they never win





 Winning bid increases significantly and unexpectedly from one year to the next

• A vendor charges higher prices to local customers than to distant ones (may indicate a fixed local market).



Look for Physical Clues in the Bids in Addition to **Vendor Behavior**



Last-minute changes to the bid:


- Whiteouts
- Other physical alterations of the bid amount






Similarities in the appearance of competitors' bid materials:


- handwriting
- unusual typeface
- stationary
- fax information
- grammar, punctuation or math errors








Physical clues may be found on the envelope or other packaging...





Simple math can be a bid-rigger's downfall...

		DEA 13H-8	I-85-B-8852		6	35 PAGES
ME OF OFFE	NOR ON CONTRACTOR					
	Capital Ice Creas Wholesa	Lers, Inc.				-
TEM NO	SUPPLIES / SER	VICES	QUANTITY	UNIT	UNIT PRICE	AMOUNT
	GROUP II - ICE CREAM I WASHINGTON, DC (100% S	RODUCTS - ST ELIS	ABETH'S L BUSIN	nost	ITAL,	
	ICE CREAM, REGULAR, VA	NILLA, TYPE I, MP (MIN)				
11	BULK, 2 1/2 OR 3 (MALLON CONTAINER PIBER/PLASTIC	6	GL	1.1z	18.72
14	13717 BRICK, INDIVIDUAL 32 SLICES PER GAL	LY WRAPPED SLICES, ON PIBER/PLASTIC	6	GL	3,38	20.28
	ICE CREAM, REGULAR, T GENERAL 8.00 MF (MIN) PROIT, NUTS OR OTHER	CHOCOLATE,				1 07
15	13722 4 (PLUID OUNCE) C	JP PIBER/PLASTIC	8,400	GL	4.p8/dx 12.45/gal	39, 112,00
16	SHERBET, REGULAR, TYPE 1373) 4 (PLUID OUNCE) C	DP PIBER/PLASTIC	4,400	DZ	1.93/dz 4.07/gal	6,732.00
17	13738 CLASS 2, ICE BAR		20	DE	.83	16.60
	ESTIMATED TOTAL GROUP II:					0
	*UNLESS OTHERWISE IND CITED BY THE BIDDER/O THE REQUIREMENTS OF T	PPEROR WILL BE PR	BEN/OFFE	NO CO	ANY BRAN	D NAME
	ONF USABLE	36-109			STAHOAR	D FORM 36 (NEV 10 by GBA





Vendor #1:

Quantity: 8,400 gallons

Unit price: \$4.50/doz. or \$11.97/gal.

Total amount: $8,400 \times $4.50 = $37,800$

Vendor #2:

Quantity: 8,400 gallons

Unit price: \$4.68/doz. or \$12.45/gal.

Total amount: $8,400 \times $4.68 = $39,312$



Due to the identical math error...

- Vendor #1 bid \$37,800 instead of \$100,548
- Vendor #2 bid \$39,312 instead of \$104,580



If electronic records are available, always check the metadata.

Competitors' bid documents should not have the same author!

Description -			
Treatment of	fat_opt.pdf		
<u>T</u> itle:			
<u>A</u> uthor:	Larry Squirrel		
Subject:		<	
Keywords:			
Created:	6/8/2006 10:45:44 AM	Additional Metadata,	
Modified:	7/10/2006 2:08:41 PM		
Application:	Acrobat PDFMaker 6.0 for V	Vord	
Advanced -			
PDF Produce	r: Acrobat Distiller 6.0 (Win	dows)	
PDF Version	n: 1.6 (Acrobat 7.x)		
Location	n: C:\Documents and Settin	gs\Thomp\My Documents\	
File Size	e: 1.81 MB (1,896,139 Byte	s)	
Page Size	e: 431.8 × 279.4 mm	Number of Pages: 1	
Tagged PD	F: No	Fast Web View: Ye	





Red Flag: Patterns

Collusion often causes
patterns to form – bidding
locations, winners, award of
subcontracts, etc.



What patterns do you see in the following examples?



EXAMPLE3 Years of Bid Results

2013

Knox County:

Dillard Construction

Licking County:

Morgan Contractors

Coshocton County:

Roberts Renovations

Muskingum County:

Pratt Construction

2014

Knox County:

Pratt Construction

Licking County:

Dillard Construction

Coshocton County:

Morgan Contractors

Muskingum County:

Roberts Renovations

2015

Knox County:

Roberts Renovations

Licking County:

Pratt Construction

Coshocton County:

Dillard Construction

Muskingum County:

Morgan Contractors



What's the pattern?

2013

Knox County:

Dillard Construction

Licking County:

Morgan Contractors

Coshocton County:

Roberts Renovations

Muskingum County

Pratt Construction

2014

Knox County:

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2015

Knox County:

Roberts Renovations

Licking County:

Pratt Construction

Coshocton County:

Dillard Construction

Muskingum County:

Morgan Contractors

Bidders are taking turns...



"BID ROTATION"





Example 2 2015 Bid Results:







What's the pattern?

The same vendors consistently win on either side of a geographic borderline that has no logical explanation

Market allocation



Example 3 – Take a look at these bid results:

County	2015 Winner & Amount	2016 Winner & Amount
Butler	Jones Co \$100,000	Jones Co \$160,000
Clermont	Jones Co \$45,000	Smith Co \$40,000
Greene	Smith Co \$50,000	Jones Co \$90,000
Hamilton	Smith Co \$150,000	Wilson Co \$180,000
Montgomery	Wilson Co \$125,000	Smith Co \$150,000
Preble	Wilson Co \$75,000	Wilson Co \$70,000
Warren	Jones Co \$55,000	Smith Co \$60,000





What's the pattern?



Divided by geography?

No.





What's the pattern?



Winners rotated in some orderly fashion?

No.

County	2015 Winner & Amount	2016 Winner & Amount	
Butler	Jones Co \$100,000	Jones Co \$160,000	
Clermont	Jones Co \$45,000	Smith Co \$40,000	
Greene	Smith Co \$50,000	Jones Co \$90,000	
Hamilton	Smith Co \$150,000	Wilson Co \$180,000	
Montgomery	Wilson Co \$125,000	Smith Co \$150,000	
Preble	Wilson Co \$75,000	Wilson Co \$70,000	
Warren	Jones Co \$55,000	Smith Co \$60,000	



Let's analyze these results using a different tool:



Total dollar amount awarded in 2015: \$600,000

Total dollar amount awarded in 2016: \$750,000

So, how much did each bidder win?



2015:

Smith \$50,000 150,000 \$200,000 Jones \$100,000 45,000 55,000 \$200,000

Wilson \$125,000 75,000 \$200,000

2016:

Smith \$40,000 60,000 150,000 \$250,000

Jones \$160,000 90,000 \$250,000

Wilson \$70,000 180,000 \$250,000

What's the pattern?

All bidding companies end up winning the same amount of work over a series of bids



The more elaborate the pattern, the harder it will be to detect.

One bid rotation scheme determined the winning bidder by ...



The phases of the moon!



Case Study #3



Background:

- 2014-16
- Broome County, NY
- The conspirators: Bert Adams Disposal, Inc. and Taylor Garbage Service, Inc.
- Contracts affected: Residential, Business, and Municipal Waste Hauling Services



Formation of the Conspiracy

Just wondering if you would be willing to sit down sometime with Pat and I and talk about things in the battle field. I'd like to try to work out a plan to work with each other rather than working against each other. Because the customer is the only one that wins when we're at each other's throat. Give it some thought and let me know. BT

Yes anytime just tell me where I got to meet you




Price-fixing Agreement





Bid-rigging and Sham Bidding





The Outcome – April 9, 2018

- Bert Adams Disposal/owner class E felony (\$1 million penalties);
- 2 Bert Adams Disposal employees misdemeanor (\$37,500 each in penalties);
- Taylor Garbage Service/owner \$550,000 penalty



Case Study #4



Background:

- 2012-17
- Mississippi
- The conspirators: Real estate investors Kevin Moore, Chad Nichols, and Terry Tolar
- Affected transactions: Public real estate foreclosure auctions



The Conspiracy

Moore, Nichols, and Tolar agreed in advance which of them would win each property.





The Conspiracy

Conspirators that agreed not to bid received payments.



The Impact

- Sale prices of auctioned foreclosure properties suppressed;
- Homeowners, creditors, and taxing authorities received lower proceeds.



The Outcome – April 10, 2018

- Moore, Nichols, Tolar pled to felony Sherman Act violation;
- Sherman Act violation maximum of 10 years in prison, \$1 million fine






Can a business violate the antitrust law by agreeing with someone other than a competitor?







As of April 2016, R.C. 1331.01(C)(2) was amended to clarify the scope of who can commit a criminal Valentine Act violation.



When a public contract is awarded by competitive selection, a violation may be committed by:

- Two or more bidders/potential bidders; or
- One or more bidders/potential bidders AND "any person affiliated with a public office."



Fact patterns that may fall within the new language of R.C. 1331.01(C)(2):

- Vendor bribes government purchasing employee;
- Government employee/official "fixes" the bidding process to throw business to a relative.





What are the criminal penalties provided in Ohio's Valentine Act?



R.C. 1331.99

Fifth degree felony UNLESS:

- Amount of commerce involved is \$7,500 or more;
- Transaction involves purchase/sale by local, state, or federal governmental entity; or
- Transaction is wholly or partly funded by local, state, or federal governmental entity.

If any of the foregoing apply Fourth degree felony



The Takeaway:

If you suspect vendor collusion, call the Ohio Attorney General's Antitrust Section.





Anyone can report a tip anonymously at: www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov
Or call: 1-800-282-0515



We are happy to partner with other law enforcement agencies

- or -

to take the referral and handle it from there.









How to contact us

Ohio Attorney General Antitrust Section 150 E. Gay Street, 22nd Floor Columbus, OH 43215

Section Main Line: 614-466-4328

